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JUDICIAL ANALYSIS DURING THE
THIRD WAVE OF SCHOOL FINANCE
LITIGATION: THE MASSACHUSETTS
DECISION AS A MODELt
WILLIAM E. THRO *
Since the late 1960s, litigants, alarmed at the existence of funding
disparities between local school districts' and believing that it is wrong
for local property values to determine the quality of a child's educa-
tion, 2 have challenged the validity of their state's public school financ-
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I Indeed, these disparities in local funding have become so great that ”filf a state without a
previous history of public financing were now proposing the initiation of a plan, it is highly
unlikely that the system of dual responsibility . [both local and state] would be adopted."
Annette B. Johnson, State Court Intervention. In School Finance. Reform, 28 CI.EV. Si. 1, Rix. 325,
327-28 (1979).
2 Although local school districts receive funds from both federal and state sources, all local
school districts, except those in Hawaii, raise much of the money necessary for operations through
a percentage tax, with the rate set by the local residents, on the value of the real property in the
district.
The states, however, have recognized the existence of funding disparities and have utilized
three distinct methods of correcting the disparities. First., the state may give flat rate grants of a
certain amount of money per pupil or per teacher to a given school district, regardless of its
ability to raise funds through the local tax base. Second, the state may enact a so-called foundation
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ing methods in an effort to win finance reforms These challenges to
the school finance systems of the various states can be divided into
three distinct "waves" of cases. 4
 Each wave has its own identifiable set
of characteristics with respect to legal theory, methods of judicial
analysis and the plaintiffs' success rate. Although each wave has pro-
found implications for American education, the most significant wave,
program which guarantees that the state will provide funds up to a certain level for any district
that is unable to raise that level of money through taxes. Third, and probably most effectively,
the state may enact a power equalization plan whereby the state guarantees the same amount of
money per pupil to all districts that tax themselves at the same rate. Johnson, supra note 1, at
328-30.
For the most part, these remedies have failed to correct the Nast disparities. Indeed, public
school finance reform litigation has consistently involved states using either the second or third
method, or both methods. Id; see also John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable
Test For State Financial Structures, 57 CAI.. L. REv. 305, 313-16 (1969).
3
 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Parker v. Mandel,
344 F. Supp. 1068 (I). Md. 1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971);
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970); McInnis
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969); Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2c1 107 (Ala. 1993); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2(1590 (Ariz.
1973); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d
1241 (Cal. 1971) (hereinafter Serrano 1); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977) (hereinafter Serrano II); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005
(Colo. 1982) (en bane); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285
S.E.2d 156 (Ca. 1982); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302
N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Edw., 458 A.2d 758
(Md. 1983); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Gould v.
Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill,
303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Robinson v. Dickey, 414 U.S. 976 (1974) (herein-
after Robinson I); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359
(N.Y. 1982); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Ethic., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), aff'd mem.,
361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 NAN'.2c1247 (N.D.), petition
for reh'g filed, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 26 (N.D. 1994); Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City
of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v.
State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Coalition for Equitable
Sch. Funding v. State, 811 1 3,2d 116 (Or. 1991); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland
County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851
S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewoocl Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle
Sch. Dist No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en bane); Northshore Sch. Dist No. 417 v.
Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover,
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.
1986), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). For a discussion of those cases decided before 1990 and
of the general role of state constitutional provisions in public school finance reform litigation,
see generally Render Them Safe, supra note *, at 1656-78.
4 The idea of waves of litigation comes from Thro, Third Wave, supra note *. This idea has
been reiterated by other scholars, see, e.g., Gail F. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative
Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HAttv. J. LEGis. 507, 507-08 (1991); Julie
K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 MARV.
J.L. & Puts. POLICY 517, 520-35 (1991).
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in terms of cases,' numbers of plaintiff's' victories' and amount of substan-
tial change,'' is the current third (post-1988) wave of cases.' Indeed,
since 1988, supreme courts in seven states, Alabama,' Kentucky,'" Mas-
sachusetts," Montana, 12 New Jersey,'" Tennessee" and Texas,' 5 have
struck clown their respective school finance systems."
This Article explores the methodology of judicial decision-making
in this most recent and significant wave of litigation by focusing on the
1993 Massachusetts decision of McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive
Office of Education, and comparing the Massachusetts methodology
with that of other third wave decisions.' 7
 The Article accomplishes its
5 At present, third wave cases have been decided or are pending in more than half of the
states, Indeed, litigation is so widespread that the National Association of Attorneys General is
attempting to coordinate efforts and share resources among its members.
6 `Io date, the plaintiffs are 7-3-1 at the state supreme court level, The tie conies from North
Dakota where a majority of the North Dakota Supreme Court wished to invalidate the system,
but the vote was short of the super majority required by the State Constitution. Bismarck Pub.
Sch. Dist. Nu. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 247. While this Article was being written, the North Dakota
Supreme Court was considering a petition for rehearing on the case. 1994 N.D. ',EMS 26 (N.D.
1994). The plaintiffs have won trial court victories in several other states.
7
 Unlike the plaintiffs' victories in the first and second waves, which often resulted in only
cosmetic changes, the third wave cases have resulted in major changes. For example, Kentucky
completely reformed all of its education laws and diminished the power of the Superintendent
of Public Instruction; meanwhile, the 'texas Legislature continues to search for an acceptable
method of funding education.
8 Opinion of the justices, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Helena Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N j. 1990);
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); Coalition for Equitable Sch.
Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or, 1991); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d
139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Kukor v.
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516 (Ma. 1993); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993).
' Opinion of the justices, 624 S.E.2d at 109. This decision is unique in that the Alabama
Supreme Court simply said that the State had to obey a trial court ruling which was never
appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court did not pass on the merits. Id.
'° Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.
11 MCDUA 615 N,E,2d at 553-54.
12
 Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690.
18 Abbott, 575 A.2d at 407-08.
14 Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 154-55 (Tenn. 1993).
15 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S,W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
18
 The Supreme Courts of three states, Minnesota, Nebraska and Oregon have upheld their
school finance systems. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315-16 (Minn. 1993); Gould v. Orr,
506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116,
118-19 (Or. 1991). For a commentary on the Oregon decision, see Thro, implications, supra note
*, at 1016-21.
17
 515 N.E.2d 516 (Ma. 1993). The Massachusetts decision really is the best model to date
for third wave judicial analysis. Unlike the courts in other states, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court explicitly addressed most of ihe questions common to third wave cases. Id. at 523.
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objective in three sections. The first section explores the history of
school finance and the characteristics of all three waves.' 8
 It pays special
attention to the distinguishing characteristics of third-wave cases that
separate them from the first two waves. The second section identifies
issues which are common to all third-wave school finance cases. 1 ° Fi-
nally, the Article examines third-wave judicial analysis by reviewing the
way the Massachusetts court resolved these common issues, and by
comparing the Massachusetts resolution to those of other states.
I. HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE THIRD-WAVE CASES
During the first wave of school finance cases,2° which lasted from
the late 1960s until the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 21 litigation arose
under the Federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 22 Essentially,
the plaintiffs asserted either that all children were entitled to have the
Courts confronted with this issue in the future could do much worse than imitate the Massachu-
setts court.
18 This section is intended to provide general background for readers who may not be
familiar with school finance litigation and the surrounding literature.
1 °As explained infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text, the five common questions are:
(I) is the suit primarily a quality suit or an equality suit; (2) if a quality suit, does the education
clause provide a particular standard of quality; (3) if a particular standard is mandated, what is
that standard; (4) does the present system meet that standard; and (5) if the present system does
not meet the standard, what role, if any, does the present financial system play in this determi-
nation.
20 San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Parker v. Mandel, 344 F.
Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. III. 1968); Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1291 (Cal. 1971).
21 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
22
 It was thought that the Federal Constitution's equal protection clause, U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law."), might include a guaranteed right to substantially equal funding for all school districts
within a given state. This theory of using the Federal Equal Protection Clause to gain public
school finance retbrm was initially rejected by two federal district courts. In McInnis v. Shapiro,
an Illinois federal district court conceded that higher funding levels meant a higher quality of
education. 293 F. Stipp. 327, 331 (N.D. III. 1968). However, the court could not articulate a
standard for determining if the Constitution was violated. Id. at 335-36. Similarly, in Burruss v.
Wilkerson, a Virginia district court, relying on McInnis, urged the plaintiffs to lobby the legislature
to implement finance reform. 310 F. Stipp, 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969). As one scholar observed:
"Neither suit was successful because the courts, having construed the plaintiffs' claims as seeking
a system which provided resources on the basis of educational 'need,' felt there were no man-
ageable standards for a court to determine such 'need.'" Levin, Current Trends in School Finance
Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DUKE 14. 1099, 1101 (1977).
Accordingly, the public school finance reform advocates developed a new, less complex
theory, called the "fiscal neutrality" theory, which "focused on freeing the tie between level of
expenditures and district property wealth" rather than on the more amorphous concept of
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same amount of money spent on their education, or that children were
entitled to equal educational opportunities ("equality suit"). In effect,
those equality suits were premised on the belief that more money
meant a better education and on a lack of tolerance for any differences
in money or opportunities."
Similarly, during the second wave, 24 which began with the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. CahilP and lasted
until early 1989, the emphasis continued to be on equality suits. 2"
However, because Rodriguez had foreclosed the use of the Federal
Constitution, the plaintiffs were forced to rely on state constitutional
"need." N The fiscal neutrality theory was developed in Joi1t4 E. COONS LT AL, PRIVATE WEALTII
AND Puni.n: EnucarioN (1970) and discussed in Levin, infra, at 1101 n.10.
The new "fiscal neutrality" theory was first presented to a court in Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241,
1244 (Cal. 1971). In Serrano I, the California Supreme Court accepted the new theory and,
accordingly, held that the state's school financing plan violated both the federal and state equal
prfitection guarantees because it made an education "a function of the wealth of (the child's)
parents and neighbors." Id, at 1244, 126'3.
The acceptance of the fiscal neutrality theory by the California Supreme Court in Serrano 1
led to die first wave of public school finance reform litigation. "For eighteen months, school
finance systems in state after state were challenged on the basis of the 'fiscal neutrality' theory
. . ." Levin, supra at 1099. In fact, suits were filed in more than two thirds of the states. Id, at
1101
"To prevail under this equality theory, the plaintiffs had to persuade the court that educa-
tion was a fundamental right, see Serrano II, 557 P.241 929, 951 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill,
376 A.2d 359, 373-74 (Conn. 1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864-65 (W. Va. 1979);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 600 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980), or that wealth was
a suspect class or that the finance system was irrational, see Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651
S.W,2d 90, 93 (Ark, 1983).
24 See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S,W,2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano II, 557 P.2d
929 (Cal. 1976); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2(1 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en bane);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1982);
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Ethic.,
458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Britt v. North Carolina Suite Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C.), riff 'd
mem., 361 S.E.2t1 71 (N.C. 1987); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1993); Board of Educ.,
Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Board of Educ. of the
City of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma,
Inc. v. State, 746 14.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 1 4.2(1 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey,
399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978)
(en bane); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis, 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 1 4.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
25 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). For a contemporary assessment of the potential impact of the
Robinson decision, see Paul L. Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions:
Robinson v. Cahill Points The Way, 27 RUTGERS L. Rev. 365, 372 (1973); Paul L. Tractenberg,
Robinson v. Cahill: The Thorough and Efficient Clause, 38 LAw & CON'I'EMI'. PROBS. 312, 329-31
(1973); Ruvoldi, Educational Financing In New Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill And Beyond, 5 SETON
HALL L. Rev. 1, 15-26 (1973).
21i The exception was the Washington case which was a quality suit. Seattle Sch. Dist. No, 1
v. State, 585 1 4.2d 71, 85-87 (Wash. 1978).
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provisions, 27
 particularly state equal protection clauses 28
 and, to a much
lesser extent, state education clauses. 29 Although the plaintiffs were
27 The state constitutions are fundamentally different from their federal counterpart, Robert
F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the
Washington Constitution's Declaration of Rights, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL. LAw '239, 241-42 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1984). As Professor Howard observed, "[On
ways that are simply beyond their reach at the federal level, the people of a state have the
opportunity to make immediate choices about fundamental issues of constitutional law." A.E.
Dick Howard, Introduction: A Frequent Recurrence To Fundamental Principles, in RECENT DEVEI:
OPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW XXI (Bradley 1). McGraw ed., 1984) (hereinafter Intro-
duction).
For example, it has been observed that the Federal Constitution is one of limited powers
(the federal government can only do those things explicitly or implicitly specified in the docu-
ment) while the state constitutions are limitations on otherwise unlimited power (the suites can
do anything except that prohibited by the federal or state constitutions). State constitutions are
also much more 'political" in that they can be easily amended to reflect the current values. In
addition, state constitutions often protect individual rights, such as the right to an education,
that are not guaranteed by the federal charter. Utter, supra, at 242. See also Douglas, State judicial
Activism—The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1144-45 (1978).
Finally, unlike the Federal Constitution which has been amended only seventeen times since
1791, state constitutions are frequently amended and often completely rewritten and revised. For
a review of the factors that should be considered in revision of a state constitution, see generally
May, 'limas Constitutional Revision: Lessons, 66 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 64 (1977); A.E. Dick Howard,
Constitutional Revision: Virginia and the Nation, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (1974); Bradshaw, Constitu-
tional Revision in a Southern State, 19 TENN. L. REV. 734 (1947); MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE
CoNsTrruTtoNAL REVISION 67-85 (W.B. Graves ed., 1960). See also Courts Oulahan, The Proposed
New Columbia Constitution: Creating a "Manacled State, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 635 (1983) (discussing
proposed constitution for Washington, D.C. if it ever became state).
28
 For purposes of this Article, the term "state equal protection clause" refers to the few
specific equal protection clauses or those provisions which have been interpreted as mandating
equal protection. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tifx.
L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1985). For example, N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ I, which while not being an explicit
equal protection clause, has been interpreted as having the same or at least a substantially similar
effect as the Federal Equal Protection Clause. For a discussion of equal protection analysis during
the first and second waves, see generally, Render Them Safe, supra note *.
29
 An education clause, which exists in every state constitution except that of Mississippi,
mandates that some sort of system of free public education system be maintained. See AtA. CONST.
art. 14, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § I;
CAI.. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 5; Cow. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST.
art. X, § I; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § VII, 1 1; HAWAII CONST. art. IX, § 1;
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § I; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. 9,
§ 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; I.A. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. 8, § VIII;
Mu. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. ch . 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1; Mo. CONST. art. 9, § I (a); Mohrr. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § I; Nix.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt.. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XII,
§ I; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1; 01110 CONST.
art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. X111, § I; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14, R.I.
CONST. art. XII, § I; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI,
§ 12; TEX. CoNs'r. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. CIL 2, § 68; VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § I; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST, art 22, § 3 WYO.
CONST. art. VII, § I.
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able to prevail in Arkansas, 3° California,3 ' Connecticut,32 New Jersey,"
Washington,34 West Virginia" and Wyoming," the overwhelming ma-
jority of the cases resulted in victories for the state. 37
In contrast, the third wave," which began with plaintiff victories
in Montana," Kentucky4" and Texas4 ' in 1989 and continues to the
present, has been fundamentally different in three ways. First, instead
of emphasizing equality of expenditures, the plaintiffs have argued that
all children are entitled to an education of at least a certain quality
and that more money is necessary to bring the worst school districts
up to the minimum level mandated by the state education clause
("quality suit"). In these suits, the emphasis has been on differences in
quality of education delivered, rather than on the resources available
to the districts.42 The school systems are being struck down not because
some districts have more money than others, but because the quality
of education in some schools, not necessarily the poorest in financial
terms, is inadequate.
Second, rather than relying on the state equal protection clause,
which had been the focus of the school finance provisions prior to
1989, the new wave decisions have been based exclusively on the
education clauses of individual states' constitutions. This represents a
profound shift in litigation strategy. 43 Because the interpretation of the
education clauses has fewer implications for other areas of the law, this
shift appears to make plaintiffs' victories more likely. Consequently, if
the plaintiffs can prove that some schools are below the constitutional
To hold that an education clause mandates school finance reform, a court would have to
find that the presence of funding disparities indicates that the legislature has failed to meet the
obligation imposed by the clause.
3° DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Ark. 1983).
31 Serrano II, 557 P.2(1 929, 952-53 (Cal. 1976).
32 Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn. 1977).
33 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 296-97 (NI. 1973).
mSeattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 1'.2d 71, 104 (Wash. 1978).
35 Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 883-84 (W. Va. 1979).
35 Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hcrschlcr, 606 P.2d 310, 335-36 (Wyo. 1980).
"See supra note 24 for other cases.
"See ,supra note 8.
"Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont 1989).
°Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989).
Al Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
42 Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 4, at 536-37, 543; Buchanan & Verstegen, School
Finance Litigation in Montana, 66 Enuc. L. REP. 19, 32 (1991); Thro, Third Wave, supra note *,
at 238-39.
43 Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 4, at 530; Buchanan & Verstegen, supra note 42, at.
32; Thompson, School Finance and the Courts: A Reanalysis of Progress, 59 EcoN. L. REP. 945,
960-61 ( 1990 ); Thro, Third Wave, supra note *, at 239.
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standard and that this deficiency is caused by a lack of resources, it
becomes, theoretically, much easier for them to prevail. 44
Third, the courts have been more sweeping in their pronounce-
ments and their willingness to take control of the financing of educa-
tion. In the 1989 decision of Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,
Kentucky's highest court invalidated not only the finance system but
every statute relating to the public schools, and then ordered the
legislature to design a new system." When the Texas Legislature at-
tempted to correct its educational finance system, the Texas Supreme
Court, in the 1991 decision of Edgewood Independent School District v.
Kirby, held that the remedy was inadequate and ordered the legislators
to try again." Previously, the courts had readily accepted the legislative
correction.
This emphasis on quality of education rather than on equality of
funding, based on the narrow education clauses rather than the broad
equal protection provisions, and requesting sweeping reform accom-
panied by continued court supervision, represents the future of school
finance reform litigation.
U. COMMON QUESTIONS IN ALL THIRD WAVE CASES
In every school finance case in the third wave, there are a number
of common issues. 47 In McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of
Education, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts identified sev-
eral significant issues when it observed:
[W]e shall restrict ourselves to a determination whether the
constitutional language of Part II, C. 5, § 2, is merely horta-
tory or aspirational, or whether [it] imposes instead a consti-
tutional duty on the Commonwealth to ensure the education
of children in the public schools.
We conclude that a duty exists. Second, we shall attempt to
describe the nature of that duty and where it lies. Third, we
shall consider whether on this record such a duty is shown to
be violated."
44
 In the recent Oregon case, however, the plaintiffs were unable to prevail. See Coalition for
Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 121 (Or. 1991).
45
 790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989).
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.I.V.2d 491, 495-96 (Tex. 1991).
41 Many, but not ail, third wave cases also raise questions involving standing, adequacy of
pleading, and issues related to claims under the state equal protection clause.
Methef6, 615 N. E.2d at 519.
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The Mcnufb court, however, neglected to mention two additional
issues: (1) whether the suit was a quality suit or an equality suit; and
(2) if there was a violation, what role, if any, money played in the
violation. 49 When these two additional issues are combined with the
three issues expressly identified in McDuffy, a five-question model
for all third wave judicial analysis emerges.
First, before a court can properly analyze any school finance suit,
it must ascertain, preferably explicitly, whether the litigation before it
is primarily an equality suit or a quality suit. Obviously, if the case is
primarily an equality suit, application of quality suit analysis, which is
detailed below, is totally inappropriate. In such a case, the court should
utilize the equal protection analysis that was common to first and
second wave cases. Consequently, such questions as whether education
is a fundamental rightt"i° or whether the school finance system is irra-
tional will dominate the analysis.
Second, if the court finds that it has a quality suit, it must begin
its analysis by determining if the education clause imposes a specific
standard of quality or is "merely hortatory or aspirational." 51 In making
this assessment, the court should recognize that the mere fact that a
state constitution has an education clause does not mean that a par-
ticular standard of quality is necessarily mandated. After all, forty-nine
states have education clauses of some form." Yet, the clauses have a
variety of different wordings. Given the differences in wording, courts
should not assume that all of them mandate the same or nearly the
same quality standard. 53
 Instead, the court should focus on the actual
language of the education clause and the way it compares to the
educational provisions of other states.
As Professors Grubb and Ratner have independently observed, the
state education clauses can be divided into four categories based upon
"Arguably, there is an additional issue of whether the judiciary or the legislative branch will
craft the remedy for the violation. Because every court to date has deferred to the legislature,
however, at least initially, this appears to be a non-issue. Moreover, if a court did not defer to the
legislature, it probably would be exceeding its proper role.
50
 When confronted with a state equal protection argument in public school finance reform
cases, state courts generally behave as they do in other equality contexts and use the federal strict
scrutiny/rational basis framework. The slate courts, however, have consistently chosen to employ
a variety of independent tests for fundamentality within the federal framework. See Render Them
Safe, supra note s, at 1670-78.
51 MCDUfb, 615 N.E.2d at 519.
52 See the list of education clauses, supra note 29.
"As discussed infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text, the education clauses can be
divided into four distinct categories based on the degree of duty imposed.
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the duty imposed on the state legislature.54
 In some states, "Category
I" clauses impose a legislative duty which is met by simply establishing
a public school system. 55
 In other states," "Category II" clauses require
that the system be of a specific quality or have some characteristic such
as "uniformity."57
 The "Category III" education clauses go beyond the
specific quality level of Category II and set up the school system for a
specific purpose. 58
 Finally, in the few states with "Category IV" clauses,
education is the "primary," "fundamental" or "paramount" duty of the
state legislature." If this language is taken literally, the needs of the
public school system must be addressed before the state's needs for
roads, parks and other social services.
It is quite easy to see how these differences could manifest them-
selves in judicial analysis. 6° For example, because Category I clauses do
not specify any level of quality, courts would not find such a mandate;
to find a quality mandate with a Category I education clause is to
ignore the plain language of the provision. 6 ' Similarly, because Cate-
54 Grubb, Breaking The Language Barrier: The Right To Bilingual Education, 9 HARV.
L. REV. 52, 66-70 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty For Urban Public. Schools: Effective
Education In Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REV. 777, 814-16, n.143-46 (1985). Although I have utilized
the work of Grubb and Ratner in several school finance articles, I have modified some of their
classifications to reflect more accurately the language of the education clauses. This Article uses
the classifications articulated in Thro, Role of Language, supra note *, at 25-27.
55
 SeeAl..A. CONST. art. 14, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § I; ARIZ. CONST. art. Xl, § 1; CONN.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAWAII CONST. art. IX, § I; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; LA. CoNsT. art. VIII,
§ I; MASS. CONST. ch . 5, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; TENN.
CoNsr. art. XI, § 12; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch . 2, § 68.
56 See ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; DE.L. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; MD, CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1; MINN.
CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1; Most'''. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § I; OHIO CONST. art. V1,
§ 3; OR. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; TEX. CONST. art, VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § I; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CONST. art_ X, § 3.
57
 Generally, the specific quality is "thorough and/or efficient." As the West Virginia Supreme
Court observed, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania have thorough and
efficient clauses; Colorado, Idaho and Montana require thorough systems; and Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Kentucky and Texas require efficient systems. Pauley v, Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865
(W, Va. 1979).
59 See CA I.. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST, art. 9, § 2; NEV. CONST.
art. XI, § 2, R.I. CoNsT, art. XII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII , § I; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § I. Rattler,
supra note 54, at 815 & n.145; Grubb, supra note 54, at 68.
59 See GA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § I, 1 1; IL.. CONST. art. X, § 1; ME. CoNs'r. art. 8, § I; Mum.
CoNsr. art. VIII, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 1(a); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; 1A'Asti. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1.
60 This theory is explained more fully in Thro, Role of Language, supra note *, at 25-27.
61 Only two Category I clauses, those in Massachusetts and Tennessee, have ever been
interpreted as imposing a quality standard. See McDufb, 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Ma. 1993);
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn. 1993).
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gory 111 and IV clauses appear to impose either a greater quality
standard or a greater duty than Category 11 clauses,u a plaintiffs'
victory, theoretically, should be easier in states with these clauses."
Third, if the court answers the second question by determining
that the education clause does impose a standard of quality, it must
move to the next question and define exactly what that quality standard
means.64 The answer to this inquiry effectively determines the outcome
of the litigation.• If the court sets an extremely high standard, then it
will be virtually impossible for school districts to measure up. In con-
trast, if the court sets a low standard, such as the minimum standards
for accreditation required by the State Board of Education,"' the system
will almost always pass muster.°
Fourth, having answered the third question and determined what
the quality standard means, the court then must apply that standard
to the particular school districts and determine if there has been a
violation. Although, as noted above, the exact definition of quality will
effectively determine whether school districts fall below the standard,
arguably there remains an issue as to how widespread the failure must
be in order for there to be a violation. 68 If only one school district fails
to measure up, does that mean that the entire system is in violation?
What if ten, twenty, or even fifty percent fail to meet the constitution-
ally mandated standard? Does the size of those districts which fail to
meet the standard matter?"
Fifth, if the court determines that the failure to meet the consti-
tutional standard is extensive enough to warrant a finding of a system-
wide violation, there remains the question of the significance of fund-
62 Category II is the lowest category fii• which it is possible to find a quality standard mandate
based on the language of the education clause.
63 This is particularly true with Category IV clauses which, on their face, appear to require
that the schools be funded before other concerns,
°Ideally, a court would practice "horizontal federalism" and look to the decisions of other
states which interpret similarly worded education clauses,
°Moreover, as explained infra, there is no way to determine which choice the court will
make. It appears to be entirely arbitrary.
66 This was the standard articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court. in Skeen a State, 505
N.W.2d 299, 308-09 (Minn. 1993).
°For example, in the last three years, the Colorado State Board of Education has never
failed to accredit a school district which was up for accreditation. A similar pattern pervades in
other states.
°Similarly, because it is possible that there will he individual schools which meet or fail to
meet standards within a given school district, there is an issue as to how widespread within a district
the failure must he for the district to be in violation.
For example, although Colorado has 176 school districts, approximately 30% of the
students are in three school districts (Jefferson County, Denver and Douglas County).
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ing in the failure of the system to meet the constitutionally mandated
standard." The mere fact that all school districts do not measure up
does not necessarily mean that this failure is caused by a lack of money.
There are a wide variety of other factors, including mismanagement,
excessive administration, too many incompetent teachers, misplaced
spending priorities, outright corruption, nepotism, an improper em-
phasis on some programs, the need to bus to achieve racial desegrega-
tion7 i and the necessity of complying with other federal laws such as
the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act" or Title IX," which
might cause a school district to fall below the constitutional standard.
Even if lack of money is a cause, or even the primary cause, of the
district's inadequacy, it is almost inevitable that there will be other
non-financial causes. Thus, in order to correct the inadequacy, it may
be necessary to do more than restructure the finance system. Indeed,
it may be necessary for a district to undergo fundamental reform of
its entire educational system rather than simply to distribute more
money. 74
III. THE MASSACHUSETTS APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE COMMON
QUESTIONS IN ALL THIRD-WAVE CASES
A. Is the Suit Primarily an Equality Suit or a Quality Suit?
Unfortunately, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in
McDuffy, like every court to consider a school finance case, failed to
identify explicitly whether the suit before it was a quality suit or an
equality suit. However, the MeDuffi Court did acknowledge implicitly
that the suit was a quality suit:
7° This question apparently has never been addressed explicitly in a school finance case.
71
 For example, the Denver School District, which has court ordered busing, spends more,
per pupil, on transportation than most Colorado school districts.
72 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420.
73 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. This is particularly true now that the federal courts have held that
the athletic participation of each sex must mirror the enrollment. See Roberts v. Colorado State
Univ. 8l4 F. Stipp. 1507, 1510-11 (D. Colo.), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v.
Colorado State Bd. of Agric. 998 F.2(1 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen
v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Stipp. 978,988-89 (I). R.I. 1992), affd 991 F.2d 888,907 (1st Cir. 1993);
Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Stipp. 578,584 (W.D. Pa.) affd, 7 F.3d 332,344 (3d Cir. 1993).
For a commentary on the potential impact of these and similar cases, see William E. Thro &
Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown University and the Future of Intercollegiate and Interscholastic
Athletics, 84 Ellt1C. L. REP. 611,622-27 (1993).
74
 This was the result in Kentucky, where the Kentucky Educational Reform Act (the "KERA")
was passed in response to the Rase decision.
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We note that the plaintiffs do not seek judgment that the-
Commonwealth has an obligation to equalize educational
spending across all towns or cities or that the Commonwealth
has an obligation to provide equal educational opportunities
to its students. Instead, they seek a declaratory judgment that
these constitutional provisions require the State to provide
every young person with an "adequate" education. 75
Although all third-wave cases to date can be characterized as quality
suits, this statement is the clearest and most explicit statement
in any third-wave opinion that the suit is a quality, and not an
equality, suit. 76 In contrast, other courts appear to be confused
about whether they are deciding a quality suit or an equality suit. 77
This confusion is probably clue to the fact that the litigants, al-
though clearly emphasizing quality of education, make both educa-
tion clause (quality suit) and equal protection clause (equality suit)
arguments. 78 For example, in the 1993 Tennessee case of Tennessee
Small School Systems v. McWherter, the plaintiffs alleged that the edu-
cation clause:
[E]stablishes a fundamental right to an adequate education
and that the defendants are depriving the students, on whose
behalf the suit was filed, of this fundamental right. The com-
plaint further alleges that the funding system violates the
equal protection provisions of Article XI, Section 8 and Arti-
cle I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution because the
system results in inequalities in the provisions of these educa-
tional opportunities guaranteed by Article XI, Section 12. 7"
Thus, there were both quality suit arguments (adequacy) and equal
protection arguments (fundamental right and differing treatment)
in the same quality suit.
MCDUfb, 615 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ma. 1993). As noted above, allegations of a state obligation
to equalize educational spending across cities and towns, or to provide equal education oppor-
tunities are both consistent with the idea of an equality suit.
76 The Minnesota decision had a similar emphasis on quality. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d
299, 308-09 (Minn. 1993).
"This distinction was not made in the school finance literature until the early 1990s. See,
e.g., Thro, Third Wave, supra note *; Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 4.
78 Civen that the equal protection argument has worked in the past, the plaintiffs cannot be
faulted for attempting to use every possible weapon.
79 851 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1993).
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B. If It is a Quality Suit, Does the State Education Clause Confer a
Specific Quality Standard?
The second question, whether the education clause imposes a
particular quality standard, is of vital importance. Obviously, if the
education clause does not impose a quality standard, there can be no
violation. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in McDuf6 de-
voted sixteen pages of a volume of the Northeastern Reporter80 to the
issue reviewing language, constitutional structure and a comprehen-
sive history of education in the Commonwealth. The opinion then
concluded:
What emerges from this review is that the words are not
merely aspirational or hortatory, but obligatory. What emerges
also is that the Commonwealth has a duty to provide an
education for all its children, rich and poor, in every city and
town of the Commonwealth at the public school level, and
that this duty is designed not only to serve the interests of the
children, but, more fundamentally, to prepare them to par-
ticipate as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and
interests of a republican government, namely the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts.'"
The only other third-wave court to address explicitly this issue was
the Tennessee court in the 1993 decision of Tennessee Small School
Systems v. McWherter, which utilized an approach similar to the one in
McDufb. After reviewing the history of the education clause and the
language of the clause, the McWherter court observed:
The defendants also note as significant the absence in the
1978 amendment of such words as "uniform" or "efficient,"
relied upon by other courts to grant relief. 82
The defendants' argument overlooks the plain meaning of
Article XI, Section 12. That provision expressly recognizes the
inherent value of education and then requires the General
Assembly to "provide for the maintenance, support and eligi-
bility standards of a system of free public schools." The con-
stitution speaks directly to a right of inherent value, educa-
tion. As used in Article XI, Section 12, the word "education"
"McDufb, 615 N.E.2d at 522-48.
8 t M. at 548.
"As noted supra, notes 54-57 and accompanying text, the presence of these modifiers
distinguishes a Category 1 education clause from a Category II education clause.
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has a definite meaning and needs no modifiers in order to
describe the duty imposed upon the legislature. . . . Indeed,
modifiers would detract from the eloquence and certainty of
the constitutional mandate—that the General Assembly shall
maintain and support a system of free public schools that
provides, at least, the opportunity to acquire general knowl-
edge, develop the powers of reasoning and judgment and
generally prepare students intellectually for a mature life.
Contrary to the defendants' assertion, this is an enforceable
standard for assessing the educational opportunities provided
in the several districts throughout the state. 83
Unfortunately, if one accepts the proposition that the language
of the state education clauses matters, both the McDuffy and the
McWherter courts reached the wrong result. Both the Massachu-
setts and Tennessee education clauses are Category I clauses
which cannot be regarded as imposing a quality standard. 84 Rather,
each simply mandates that the state set up a system of free public
schools.
Some courts, however, have simply avoided this question and as-
sumed that the education clause imposes a specific standard of qual-
4.83 For example, in 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Skeen v.
State, stated that, "This clause places a duty on the legislature to establish
a general and uniform system of public education."86 Similarly, the
Kentucky Supreme Court observed in the 1989 decision of Rose v.
Council for Better Education, Inc.:
Several conclusions readily appear from a reading of this
section [the education clause]. First it is the obligation, the
sole obligation of the General Assembly to provide for a
system of common schools in Kentucky. . The creation,
implementation and maintenance of the school system must
be achieved by appropriate legislation. Finally, the system
must be an efficient one. 87
The Skeen and Rose courts simply assumed the existence of a duty
and proceeded to define that duty.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 150-51.
H4 See Thro, Role of Language, supra note *, at 25-27.
HS This approach is appropriate in those circumstances where the education clause is Cate-
gory II or higher.
86 505 N.W.2d 299, 308 (Minn. 1993).
H 7 790 S.W.2d 186, 205 (Ky. 1989).
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C. If there is a Quality Standard, What does that Quality Standard
Mean?
As noted above, the question of the exact meaning of the quality
standard is critical to the outcome of the case. If the standard is set
very high, it is almost inevitable that the system will fail. In contrast, if
the standard is set relatively low, the state likely will prevail. Unfortu-
nately, no court has ever articulated a reason for choosing one stand-
ard or the other. Instead, the courts have simply imposed the value
judgment of a majority of its members. As a result, this question is
probably the least predictable of the common issues. 88
McDuf#89
 and the Kentucky opinion, Rose,9° represent the best
examples of a court unilaterally imposing a high standard. In analyzing
this question, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, simply ob-
served:
The crux of the Commonwealth's duty lies in its obligation
to educate all of its children. As has been clone by the courts
of some of our sister States, we shall articulate broad guide-
lines and assume that the Commonwealth will fulfill its duty
to remedy the constitutional violations we have identified.
The guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky
fairly reflect our view of the matter and are consistent with
the judicial pronouncements found in other decisions. An
educated child must possess "at least the seven following
capabilities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication
skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable students to make in-
formed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmen-
tal processes to enable the student to understand the issues
which affect his or her community, state, or nation; (iv) suf-
ficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental
and physical wellness; (v) suffiCient grounding in the arts to
enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and
historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so
as to enable each child to choose and pursue like work intel-
88
 indeed, the answers to this question appear to be quite arbitrary.
89 61 5 N.E.2d 516 (Ma. 1993).
"790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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ligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic and vocational
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably
with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics
or in the job market."91
Although the Kentucky-Massachusetts standard is a wonderful aspi-
ration, and probably should be the goal of every public school, it
would be next to impossible to implement. For example, under this
standard, if graduates of public schools do not understand the
Clinton Health Care Plan, the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, the war in Bosnia or the significance of school finance litiga-
tion, then the students do not understand the issues confronting
society and, thus, the schools are constitutionally deficient. With its
constant references to each child or student on some points, the
McDuffy Court implies that the failure of any child to meet that
standard creates a constitutional violation.
In contrast, the 1993 Minnesota decision, in Skeen v. State,92 rep-
resents the other extreme. The Minnesota Court appeared to hold
that the quality standard was identical to the minimum standard for
accreditation set by the State Board of Education." Because the basic
educational needs of the district were met, there was no violation.
In effect, the judiciary is deferring to the State Board of Education.
Yet, because state boards of education rarely, if ever, withdraw a
school district's accreditation, 94 all school districts would meet the con-
stitutional standard and, thus, the system would always be constitu-
tional.
The other third-wave decisions that have articulated a quality
standard fall somewhere in the middle, but tend to lean toward the
Kentucky-Massachusetts standard. For example, in the 1990 decision
of Abbott v. Burke, 95 the New Jersey Supreme Court, concluded that a
"thorough and efficient" educational system was one which gave every
student "a modicum of variety and a chance to excel.""G
Finally, at least two courts have completely avoided the issue. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the 1993 decision of Gould v. Orr, while
implicitly holding that there was a quality standard under the State
91 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Ma. 1993) (citation omitted).
•12 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
"3 Id. at 308.
•11 Indeed, although there are statutory provisions for the reorganization of a school district
if it fails to meet the accreditation standard, it appears that Ibis has never happened in Colorado
since the districts were reorganized in the 1960s.
93 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990).
"Id. at 398,
614	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:597
Constitution, declined to define exactly what the standard meant. 97
Instead, the court declared that the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege
that the school system was inadequate and, thus, dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim. 98 The Gould court went on to deny
the plaintiffs leave to amend, thereby avoiding the issue indefinitely. 99
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in McWherter, explicitly held that
the state constitution mandated a particular quality standard,m but
then decided it was unnecessary to define the contours of that stand-
ard.''' Instead, the McWherter court decided the case on the basis of
the State Equal Protection Clause. 102
D. When the Quality Standard is Applied to the School Districts of the
State, Does the Educational System Measure Up?
Once the quality standard is determined, the resolution of whether
the system meets the quality standard becomes academic. If the stand-
ard is high, the system fails. Conversely, if the standard is low, the
system passes muster. For example, the McDufb court, 1 °" after reviewing
the testimony and affidavits regarding the state of the schools, simply
held: "The bleak portrait of the plaintiffs' schools and those they typify,
painted in large part by the defendants' own statements and about
which no lack of consensus as been shown, leads us to conclude that
the Commonwealth has failed to fulfill its obligation." 194
Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Rose v. Council forBetter
Education, Inc., after reviewing the evidence of the current state of the
schools, concluded:
In spite of the past and present efforts of the General Assem-
bly, Kentucky's present system of common schools falls short
of the mark of the constitutional mandate of "efficient." When
one juxtaposes the standards of efficiency as derived from our
Constitution, the cases decided thereunder, the persuasive
97 506 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Neb. 1993).
99 Id at 353.
99 M.
199 McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 150-51.
101 Id at 152.
102 Id at 152-56.
100 Interestingly, in its opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided that the
system was unconstitutional before it articulated the exact contours or the duty. McDufb:, 615
N.E.2d at 552,554-55.
1°4 Id at 553-54.
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authority from our sister states and the opinion of experts,
with the virtually unchallenged evidence in the record, no
other decision is possible.'"
Interestingly, in reaching the opposite result, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, in Skeen v. State, was equally conclusive. The court stated:
[P]laintiffs here are unable to establish that the basic system
is inadequate or that the "general and uniform" requirement
somehow implies full equalization of local referendum levies.
Any inequities which exist do not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional violation of the state constitutional provisions . . .
Thus, we hold that the present system of educational financ-
ing does not violate the "general and uniform system of
public schools" of the Education Clause of the Minnesota
Constitution. 11 )0
In all three cases, as in most third-wave cases, the result was preor-
dained once the quality standard was established.
E. If the System Does Not Meet the Constitutional Standard, What Role,
If Any, Does a Lack of Money Play in the Violation?
If the court concludes that the system does not meet the constitu-
tional standard, there is still the additional requirement of accounting
for the deficiency. The lack of money may or may not be a factor, and
it almost certainly is not the only one. Other factors may include
mismanagement, excessive administration, lack of competent teachers,
misplaced spending priorities, outright corruption, nepotism, an im-
proper emphasis on some programs, the need to bus to achieve racial
desegregation and the necessity of complying with other federal man-
dates. 107 It may be possible that a constitutionally adequate system can
only be achieved through "radical" reform of the existing system.'"
Thus, a deficiency in the public school system theoretically could
become the basis for a public school voucher program, for single sex
schools, or for the public schools to offer a smorgasbord of curricula
105 Rase, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
10G 505 N.W.2d at 312.
107 If one or more of these conditions exist, simply pouring more money into the system will
not necessarily improve the quality of the schools. indeed, the net result may be that nothing
changes significantly, but that more money is spent.
108 As the United Suites enters the high technology age, its public schools generally continue
to function on an industrial age model using an agrarian age calendar.
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so that each child could reach his or her potential." Indeed, a finding
that a public school system is unconstitutional could be the spring-
board for implementation of a conservative or liberal agenda of re-
form.
Unfortunately, with the exception of Kentucky,"° every third-wave
court to find a constitutional violation has automatically assumed that
money and money alone is the problem. Indeed, the other courts have
not even addressed the issue of whether something other than funding
might be the problem. The McDufb) Court made its holding money-
specific by issuing a mandate for the legislature "to take such steps as
may be required in each instance effectively to devise a plan and sources
of funds sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate."'"
By focusing only on money and ignoring other potential factors,
these courts effectively have abdicated a large degree of their respon-
sibility to define the nature of the violation. To conclude, as these
courts apparently have, that money will solve everything is to endorse
a view of modern education that is extraordinarily naive. Indeed, just
as the legislatures have done a disservice to children in failing to enact
a constitutional system, these courts are also doing a disservice.
In contrast to this judicial abdication, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky, in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., recognized that
quality education involves much more than money."' The court ob-
served:
Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is that
Kentucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitu-
tional. There is no allegation that only part of the common
school system is invalid, and we find no such circumstance.
This decision applies to the entire sweep of the system—all
its parts and parcels. The decision applies to the statutes
creating, implementing, and financing the system and to all
regulations, etc., pertaining thereto. This decision covers the
creation of local school districts, school boards, and the Ken-
tucky Department of Education to the Minimum Foundation
Program and Power Equalization Program. It covers school
1 °9 Similar arguments have been made in both the cases currently pending in Connecticut
and Illinois.
It° Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
LLI Md)ufh, 615 N.E.2d at 556 (emphasis added).
112 Rose, 790 S.W.2d, at 215. Although I may disagree with certain public policy chokes which
the Legislature made in the aftermath of the Kentucky decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court
of Kentucky recognized the realities of modern education and fulfilled all of its responsibilities
as a judicial tribunal.
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construction and maintenance, teacher certification—the
whole gamut of the common school system in Kentucky." 3
Essentially, the Kentucky court threw everything out and ordered
the Legislature to start over. The result, the Kentucky Educational
Reform Act of 1990, 134 has been a sweeping overhaul of public
education in Kentucky."
IV. CONCLUSION
Over a quarter of a century after the first cases were filed, school
finance litigation continues to be a significant factor in education law.
However, despite decisions in more than half of the states, there ap-
pears to be no coherent pattern of litigation results. The primary
reason for this lack of coherence is that the litigation strategy employed
by the plaintiffs has moved from federal equal protection clause chal-
lenges seeking to ensure equality of funding or equality of educational
opportunities (first wave), to state equal protection challenges seeking
the same (second wave), to state education clause challenges seeking
a minimum quality standard (third wave).
This last strategy, emphasizing quality and the state education
clause, has resulted in a method of legal analysis which is distinctly
different from those employed in the first or second waves of litigation.
This third-wave model of judicial decision-making, which is best illus-
trated and most clearly articulated by the recent 1993 Massachusetts
decision of McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education,
consists of five questions, resolution of which will decide the suit. If
other states follow the lead of Massachusetts and utilize this compre-
hensive model, perhaps, some coherence will emerge in this area of
the law.
"3 /d. at 215.
114 1990 Ky. Acts 476.
"'For example, KERA mandated site based management of schools, stricter policies on
nepotism, ungraded primary education, increased teacher salaries, tougher teacher certification
standards, the diminishing of the powers of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the
effective endorsement of outcome based education.
At this point, no one can say whether Kentucky's grand experiment in educational reform
will be successful. Although some aspects of KERA have very vocal critics, including this author,
there is no denying that the Kentucky Supreme Court has forced the Legislature at least to try to
live up to the mandate of the State Constitution.
